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                                                                Abstract 
 
Using a firm-level survey database covering 41 countries, we evaluate firms’ abnormal retained earnings. The 
results of our work show that the trends of cash holdings and retained earnings are independent. While cash 
holdings around the world are increasing, the opposite has occurred for retained earnings. We show that cash 
holdings are influenced by precautionary motive and retained earnings by firms’ growth opportunities. Abnormal 
retained earnings have risen with GDP growth and decreased following the 2008 financial crisis. This result also 
confirms the hypothesis of firms’ growth opportunities. US firms present positive abnormal retained earnings after 
the 2008 financial crisis, contrary to the remaining firms around the world. This can explain recent trends in the 
US stock market. 
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Debate about capital structure theory has been ongoing for almost 60 years. Until the 1980s, 
the focus of financing theories centered on topics related to tax shields, bankruptcy and agency 
costs and adverse selection, creating two currents: the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory. In the last thirty years, the empirical adherence of these two theories to firms has been 
discussed (Frank and Goyal (2005) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). Simultaneously, 
during the last twenty years, researchers have evaluated not only which firm characteristics 
influence financing choices but also what role institutional setting play in firms’ capital 
structure. The legal origin, the rule of law, the perception of corruption, the protection of 
shareholder and creditors rights, the financial architecture of the country, among other aspects 
(Alves and Ferreira (2011, Booth et al (2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998, 
1999), Fan et al (2012) and Öztekin (2015)), are now very important topics concerning firms’ 
capital structure analysis.  
More recently, corporate finance has focused on another important topic related to 
financing decisions issue, the cash holding decisions (Opler et al (1999) Dittmar et al (2003), 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Song and Lee (2012)), while considering the theoretical 
approach designed for capital structure issues. In perfect financial markets, whenever firms 
need funds, they use financial markets. In fact, the question as to why firms hold cash is an 
important issue regarding financing choices once we are in the presence of a decision that does 
not present any return and future value, although it can be a strategic decision in the face of 
imperfect financial markets. Retained earnings are apparently a similar decision to cash 
holdings. Both can be explained by the trade-off theory, i.e., by comparing benefits of liquidity 
with agency costs of its misuse. The pecking order theory can also support both topics. This 
theory postulates that funds generated internally are less costly, as opposed to risky debt, 
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particularly equity, the most expensive source of financing. The free cash flow theory of Jensen 
(1986) can also be considered in the context of retained earnings and cash holdings once the 
excess of cash can be used by managers for their own interests and not those of shareholders; 
consequently, firms increase their dividend payout ratio. In fact, both variables could have the 
same purposes. However, do they really? They are on opposite sides of the balance sheet. 
Moreover, they probably have different uses. While cash holdings are used to avoid eventual 
future cash shortfalls, i.e., for precautionary purposes, retained earnings are managed according 
to firms’ eventual growth opportunities. 
Regardless of the theory that best explains either cash holdings or retained earnings, our 
results show a large difference between the impact of retained earnings and cash holdings on 
firms’ balance sheets. The weight of cash holdings on balance sheets is much higher (see Figure 
1), both before and after the 2008 financial crisis. Our results show different trends for cash 
holdings and retained earnings. The annual average of retained earnings – obtained using the 
data of all available firms – was 6.0% in the 1995-2007 period, compared to 5.0% in the 2008-
2014 period. Cash holdings, in turn, presented 20.8% and 22.2%, respectively, for each period.  
These results were not completely unexpected because there have been three financial 
crises since the beginning of the century: the dot-com bubble, the subprime mortgage crisis and 
the European sovereign debt crisis. In this environment, firms use cash holdings to hedge 
against future shortfalls, i.e., as a precaution against unforeseen situations and emergencies, 
namely, credit constraints and capital market devaluations (Graham and Harvey (2001)). On 
the other hand, a decrease in a firm’s growth opportunities and retained earnings was expected 






Figure 1 – Retained Earnings versus Cash Holdings 
 
Note: The calculations were made using a sample of 312,890 observations, 36,459 firms and 41 countries. 
 
Thus, there are several reasons for studying retained earnings and cash holdings. First, 
both variables could have the same trend in responding to financing needs. Our results do not 
confirm such a hypothesis. Second, why did firms reduce their retained earnings after the 2008 
financial crisis, as these were once the cheapest source of corporate financing?” We suspect 
this occurred because firms’ growth opportunities have been decreasing since the beginning of 
the century. Third, what is the source of financing to attain the precautionary motive? Our 
findings seem to show that retained earnings do not respond to such a need, contrary to cash 
holdings. 
The main goal of this research is to examine which firms (including countries and 
financial infrastructures) presented higher abnormal retained earnings in the period from 1995 
to 2014 and to explain such behavior. For that purpose, we use a panel of 312,890 observations 
per 36,459 firms from 41 countries.  
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The results of our work show that the trends of cash holdings and retained earnings are 
independent. While cash holdings around the world are increasing, the opposite has occurred 
with retained earnings. We show that cash holdings are influenced by precautionary motive and 
retained earnings by firms’ growth opportunities. Abnormal retained earnings have risen with 
GDP growth and decreased following the 2008 financial crisis. This result also confirms the 
hypothesis of firms’ growth opportunities. US firms present positive abnormal retained 
earnings after the 2008 financial crisis, contrary to the remaining firms around the world. This 
helps explaining recent trends in the US stock market. 
We show that there is a positive impact of banking development on retained earnings, 
contrarily to capital market development. This signifies that growth opportunities are 
influenced by the pecking order theory. On the other hand, there are some signs that 
shareholders’ rights influence negatively retained earnings. This is probably a consequence of 
the size of financing infrastructures on countries where shareholders are more protected. Still 
in relation to shareholder rights, a negative impact on retained earnings is in line with the 
“outcome model” of La Porta et al (2000), where minority shareholders force corporate insiders 
to disgorge cash. Moreover, firms located in developed financial market infrastructures 
substitute retained earnings more easily by external financing. 
A positive impact of banking development on retained earnings is observed. Firms 
placed within developed banking systems have an infrastructure that supplies capital in an 
efficient and cheaper way. Thus, whenever firms’ growth opportunities exhibit a positive trend, 
the relevant banking retains earnings for their purposes. This result also confirms the hypothesis 
of banking monitoring: in countries with developed banking systems, credit holders are more 
protected and have more information about borrowers. 
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the literature review, the 
methodology and the data; section 3 details the main results; and section 4 presents the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Determinants of cash holdings and retained earnings 
 
2.1. Cash holdings 
 
In the presence of market imperfections, cash holding policies have financial and economic 
value and are supported by the trade-off and pecking order hypotheses. However, enterprise 
value is calculated by adjusting to cash and equivalents, which means the opportunity cost of 
cash holdings is zero. Kim et al (1998) developed a model where the optimal amount of liquidity 
is determined by a tradeoff between the low returns of liquid assets and the benefit of not using 
external funds. Opler et al (1999), in turn, concluded that firms allow cash holdings to rise and 
fall with cash flow. This is in line with Myers (1984) concerning dividend payout setting, 
investment opportunities fluctuation relative to internal cash flow, and safety debt issuing. Bates 
el al. (2009) found that US firms since the 1980s have increased their average cash holdings, 
as opposed to net debt.  
Transaction costs are one of a firm’s motives for holding cash. In fact, firms need 
liquidity for their operational transactions and cash holdings are more expensive when they 
have difficulties turning cash equivalents into liquidity (Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr 
(1966)). Moreover, the more profitable the firm is, the more it requires liquidity to face its own 
transactions. Thus, there is a positive relationship between a firm’s income and liquidity. 
Nonetheless, firms tend to build up cash during recessions once it becomes more difficult to 
replace cash substitutes by liquidity. In contrast, when the market is performing well, firms 
have easier access to external markets and cash holding needs are lower. Firms also hold cash 
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in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income 
(Foley et al (2007)). On the other hand, there are other costs associated with cash holdings: 
agency costs. In fact, managers prefer to accumulate cash in order to use it for their own 
purposes, not necessarily in the interest of shareholders (Jensen (1986), Opler et al. (1999), 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003)). Firms also hold cash to increase their ability to 
access and to restructure their financing at low cost (Ferreira and Vilela (2004)).  
Despite what has been said about cash holding motives, the most plausible and 
consensual is the precautionary motive of Keynes (1936), whose purpose has been described in 
international data (Opler et al (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004, Han and Qiu (2007) and Song 
and Lee (2012)). Lins et al (2010) showed that cash holdings are related to non-operational 
activities. In fact, these savings are made to avoid future cash shortfalls instead of has being 
used in future growth opportunities. Their findings also show that firms with higher needs for 
external funding in the future, or with a belief that their equity is undervalued, do not hold extra 
cash today. On the other hand, the same authors concluded that credit lines (in comparison with 
cash holdings) are used to finance a firm’s growth opportunities.  
 
2.2. Retained earnings 
 
Supporters of the pecking order theory see retained earnings as the preferred financing source, 
followed by safety debt, risky debt and equity only as a last resort (Myers (1984) and Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (2009)). Myers and Majluf (1984) even state that firms whose investment 
opportunities are higher than their operating cash flows, and which have spent all their financing 
capacity to issue low-risk debt, may sacrifice an investment rather than issue risk securities to 
finance it. However, the followers of the dynamic trade-off theory also understand the role of 
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retained earnings. In fact, a reduction in dividend payout will decrease taxes paid, although this 
will mean a lower debt-to-assets ratio and consequently lower future fiscal savings through a 
reduction in interest payments (Stiglitz (1973), Frank and Goyal (2005)). Independently of the 
adherence to both theories, there is a stylized negative (positive) relationship between leverage 
(retained earnings) and growth opportunities around the world ((Raghuran and Rajan (1995), 
Alves and Ferreira (2011) and Fan et al (2012)). Retained earnings are also studied in the 
context of agency costs theory (Jensen (1986) and Myers (1977)). In fact, managers appreciate 
shareholders’ preferences for retained earnings once they obtain more opportunities to create 
their “empire building”. On the other hand, in the presence of an underinvestment problem, 
transferring wealth from shareholders to bondholders can be avoided by retained earnings.  
Retained earnings are intimately related with dividend policy, equity valuation (through 
dividend growth model), and net present value of growth opportunities. Lintner (1956), in his 
seminal research on dividend policy, defended the idea that dividends are dependent on the 
positive net present value projects they have available, moving toward target payouts, until new 
earning levels become unsustainable. Whether in cash holdings or in retained earnings, the issue 
of perfect financial markets has been discussed. Miller and Modigliani (1961) illustrated that in 
perfect financial markets, dividends were irrelevant and had no influence on a firm’s share 
value. However, financial markets are not perfect, and consequently there are two views on 
dividends: defenders of bird-in-hand (cash dividends) and defenders of bird-in-bush (capital 
gains). Lintner (1956), Gordon (1959) and Walter (1963) support the first point of view, arguing 
that capital gains are riskier and that investors expect to be compensated by higher returns, 
putting pressure on management to deliver higher growth in the future, which may or may not 
happen. More recently, Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock 
(1985) focused their research on a new theory: the signaling theory. They showed that, in a 
world of asymmetric information, better informed insiders use dividend policy as an indication 
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of their firm’s future prospects with less informed outsiders, and a dividend increase indicates 
an improvement in the firm’s performance, as opposed to a decrease. In fact, a dividend increase 
(decrease) should be followed by an improvement (reduction) in a firm’s profitability, earnings 
and growth.  
 
2.3. Country-level differences 
 
The impact of country variables on cash holdings and retained earnings has been studied from 
diverse aspects, particularly shareholders’ rights and agency costs (Ditmar et al (2003), Harford 
et al (2008), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), La Porta el al (2000) and Lins et al (2010)). La Porta 
et al (2000) concluded that firms with large reinvestment opportunities and that placed in a 
strong institutional setting – namely, in common-law-based countries, where shareholders 
enjoy high levels of protection – present lower dividend payouts rather than low growth firms. 
According to the above authors, firms placed in developed capital markets, even with growth 
opportunities, are available to pay high dividend payout ratios because they can account on such 
an external source of financing. This argument can be used for the development of a banking 
system (Lins et al (2010)). Thus, a negative relationship between capital market development 
(as well as banking development) and retained earnings seems to exist. Firms with weak 
shareholder rights, in turn, are forced to pay dividends because shareholders are less protected. 
This can be a way of attenuating the probable expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales (2004)). La Porta 
et al (2000) also hypothesize that firms present high payout ratios to establish a reputation for 
not exploiting shareholders. As for cash holdings, we would expect a negative relationship 
between cash holdings and developed capital markets. Kalcheva and Lins (2007), on the other 
hand, document a negative relationship between cash holdings and shareholder protection. 
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Firms placed in countries where shareholders are poorly protected present high levels of cash 
holdings. Ditmar et al (2003) conclude that such a relationship remains, after controlling 
dividend payments. This indicates that there is no evidence for managers holding more cash 
simply because it is more difficult to access capital in markets with poor shareholder protection. 
The explanation for holding cash can be found in agency problems, i.e., in the possibility of 
managers extracting wealth from shareholders. 
The impact of financial crises on retained earnings and cash holdings has also been 
studied recently (Khale and Stulz (2013), Song and Lee (2012)). Once more, cash holdings 
seem to be related to the precautionary motive and retained earnings to firms’ growth 
opportunities. Kahle and Stulz (2013), on the other hand, present a firm’s decrease in cash-to-
assets ratios during 2007-2008 followed by a sharp increase in 2009. Song and Lee (2012) show 
that the increase in cash holdings is not explained by changes in firm characteristics but by 
changes in the firm’s demand function for cash, particularly the precautionary motive. 
 
2.4. Firm variables 
 
In this research we use industry risk, dividend dummy, debt-to-assets, size and market-to-book 
as determinants of cash holdings and retained earnings. 
The impact of dividend policy on cash holdings has been studied by several authors, 
namely, Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Opler et al (1999) and Song and Lee (2012), and their 
findings are not consensual, albeit a negative influence of dividend payout on cash holdings 
and retained earnings is expected. In fact, dividend payments may help reduce the traditional 
agency problem between managers and shareholders, decreasing the amount of disposable cash 
used by executives for their own purposes (Jensen (1986)). The negative relationship between 
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cash holdings and dividend payments can also be explained by the precautionary motive. On 
the other hand, firms with an aggressive dividend policy do not have high growth opportunities 
and consequently present low levels of retained earnings. Moreover, this argument to pay 
dividends is considered a strength by the defenders of bird-in-hand, who prefer dividends 
instead of capital gains. Leverage negatively influences a firm’s cash holdings and retained 
earnings. In fact, a firm can benefit from using the cheapest financing source, retaining earnings, 
which will have a negative impact on leverage (Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
As for cash holdings, a negative relationship with leverage is expected, which is consistent with 
the pecking order and free cash flow theories. The argument that high levels of debt and low 
cash holdings occur when a firm’s investment exceeds retained earnings supports the pecking 
order theory. The main reason for supporting the free cash flow theory is that highly leveraged 
firms are subject to capital market monitoring, which prevents managerial discretion. In terms 
of industry risk, a firm that works in a sector based on higher volatility of earnings before 
interest and taxes is riskier but, as expected, more profitable. Consequently, following the 
pecking order theory, the more profitable a firm is, the more earnings it retains. Internal funds 
would be the rule of financing, instead of external funds, and consequently a positive 
relationship between retained earnings and industry risk would be expected, unless the industry 
risk is not positively related to the firm’s growth opportunities. In this case, whenever there is 
an increase in risk to the company, it is expected that returns increase and are passed along to 
shareholders. As for cash holdings, a negative relationship with industry risk is expected. In 
fact, the riskier the firm, the more cash it holds against eventual shortfalls. Size positively 
influences retained earnings. Firms retain more earnings to reinvest in current and future 
projects solely if they prosper (MacAnBhaird and Lucey (2010)), and it is well known that 
young firms grow faster but also fail at higher rates (Haltiwanger et al (2013) and Thornhill 
and Amit (2003)). Firms that are larger presumably have been more successful through earning 
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retention. Consistent with all major theories, when a firm is growing, it suffers lower adverse 
selection problems and has more chances of obtaining external financing and consequently 
requires lower cash holdings (Lins et al (2010)). According to Myers (1977), firms with more 
tangible assets should more easily be financed through debt than firms with growth 
opportunities. Their valuation is dependent of intangible assets and expected returns, and 
therefore they are subject to high financial distress costs, and their intangible assets have no 
value in the event of bankruptcy. In this case, firms avoid issuing equity because much of the 
value created by investment would be used to offset the creditors’ position (underinvestment 
problem). Thus, a positive relationship between retained earnings and the firm’s growth 
opportunities is expected, and the same sign is expected between cash holdings and MtB. 
 
3. Methodology, hypothesis and data 
 
3.1. Methodology and hypothesis. 
 
 
Recent trends in the evaluation of retained earnings and cash holdings are traced following two 
steps. First, we present the results of some regressions of cash holdings and retained earnings 
using the same independent variables (capital market development, banking development, 
shareholders rights, GDP growth, industry risk, dividend dummy, debt-to-assets, size, market-
to-book, and financial crisis dummy). Basically, our intention is to evaluate whether both 
variables are explained by the same variables, and whether firms hold cash as a precaution and 
retain earnings for investments at growth opportunities. The regressions are based on a pooled 
cross section (country, sector and year dummies) and a panel data with fixed effects (with year 
dummies). The results of Hausman tests confirm that the parameters obtained using the fixed 
effects model are consistent and efficient. In the second step, we evaluate the determinants of 
13 
 
abnormal retained earnings, based on the approach presented below. In this analysis, we also 
divide the sample into sub-samples (emerging capital markets, developed capital markets, low 
shareholder rights, high shareholder rights, civil-law-based capital markets, common-law-based 
countries and the USA).   
Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends plus 
depreciation minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others, and cash 
dividends paid divided by total assets. Cash holdings, in turn, are cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets. 
Abnormal retained earnings are obtained based on the methodology employed by Brown 
and Warner (1985) and Barber and Lyon (1996). Basically, firms’ abnormal retained earnings 
compares realized retained earnings with their expected value. The expected retained earnings 
are the firms’ annual average retained earnings by sector. The sample is divided according to 
the super sectors from the industrial classification benchmark (ICB), i.e., into 16 sectors. By 
joining firms from the same sector but located in different countries, we intend to build a 
variable that properly reflects global systematic risk. 
The expected retained earnings of firm i in year t is the firm’s average retained earnings 
in year t from the sector j where firm i operates: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡) =  𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡  
 
The abnormal retained earnings of firm i in year t, 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡, are realized retained earnings, 
𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡, less expected retained earnings, 𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡): 
 




Next, we aim to identify the determinants of 𝐴𝑅𝐸 using the independent variables and 
the models referred to previously, with the following hypotheses in mind: 
H1: Firms’ cash holdings (retained earnings) increase (decrease) after financial crises. 
H2: Firms’ cash holdings decrease with a rise in shareholder protection level.  
H3: Firms’ abnormal retained earnings decrease after financial crises.  
H4: Firms’ abnormal retained earnings increase with a rise in shareholders rights. 





The data extracted from WorldScope include firms from 41 countries: Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US.   
The sample is diversified and includes 36,459 firms and 312,890 observations, covering 
emerging capital markets, namely, the largest, such as Mexico and Brazil; several developed 
capital markets, such as the UK and the US; diverse banking-oriented countries, including 
France and Germany; countries with different levels of investor protection, such as Mexico and 
India; and countries whose economies show different levels of economic growth, such as India 
and Greece (see Table 1).   
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Data cover the period from 1995 to 2014. All firm-level variables are winsorized, 
excluding the bottom and the top 1% of the own variable distribution. In addition, financial 
institutions and utilities are excluded due the regulatory rules to which they are subject.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The average retained earnings by country varies from 3% (Greece, Hong Kong and 
Jordan) and 8% (Argentina, Denmark, Peru and Switzerland). On the other hand, the average 
cash holdings vary from 7% in Portugal to 30% in Hong Kong. We would such as to highlight, 
in respect to average cash holdings, the higher value (with statistical significance) presented by 
developed capital markets in comparison with emerging markets (5.3%). The same did not 
occur in relation to retained earnings (-0.1%). The trends of the two variables were different in 
the periods prior to and following the financial crisis. While the average retained earnings 
decreased from the period prior to and following the financial crisis (-1.8%), the opposite 
occurred in relation to cash holdings (1.0%), although in this latter situation without statistical 
significance. Finally, one must point out the positive result (0.8%) for the difference in 
abnormal retained earnings in the period prior to, in comparison to the period following, the 
financial crisis.  
Concerning firm variables, the results are heterogeneous; firms from Portugal, Pakistan 
and Greece present, on average, the highest value for debt-to-assets ratio. In contrast to this is 
Egypt (0.16). The largest firms, on average, are in the Netherlands, Mexico and Spain. Jordan 
and Sri Lanka have the smallest firms; firms in the US, Sweden, and the UK present the highest 
market-to-book, while the opposite is the case in Portugal, South Korea and Malaysia; in Japan 
and Chile, firms often pay dividends, contrarily to the United States and Canada, where firms 
pay no regularly dividends.  
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As for country variables, and specifically banking development, Japan, the United 
States and Spain provide the largest infrastructure; Peru, Argentina and Mexico, on the other 
hand, present a reduced banking development; as for capital market development, Peru, 
Argentina and Mexico present the lowest percentage for the relationship between market 
capitalization to GDP, while Singapore, Switzerland and Hong Kong present the highest; in 
terms of economic growth, India, Sri Lanka and Argentina were the front-runners during the 
1995-2014 period, while Italy and Taiwan were at the opposite end.  
Overall, it seems country variables are not definitive in establishing a pattern concerning 
firm characteristics. There are firms with growth opportunities both in developed capital 
markets and in emerging markets. The same can be said in relation to firm size and other 
variables.  
In terms of correlation coefficients, we highlight the low value obtained for the 
relationship between retained earnings and cash holdings, a sign that both outcomes are created 
by different motives. In general, the correlation coefficients present values lower than 0.10.  
 




Table 3 presents the determinants of cash holdings and retained earnings using a pooled data 
(with year, country and sector dummies) and a panel with fixed effects (with year dummies). 
We calculate the Hausman tests and they confirm the efficiency and consistency of the 
parameters of the panel data with fixed effects. 
 The results of all regressions confirmed that after a financial crisis, the level of cash 
holdings increased, contrarily to retained earnings. It seems that cash holdings are used to hedge 
17 
 
against future cash shortfalls. On the other hand, retained earnings decrease after a financial 
crisis. It is possible that the decrease in firms’ growth opportunities was primarily responsible 
for this result. Moreover, in the face of decreases in investment opportunities, shareholders 
increased their payout ratios once they simultaneously preferred a bird-in-hand and impeded 
managers from using their money without respecting their interests.  
Concerning the four institutional variables – capital market development, banking 
development, shareholder rights and GDP growth – cash holdings increase after a rise in such 
institutional variables, except with GDP growth. The impact of GDP growth on cash holdings 
is not conclusive. In fact, the results are dependent on an econometric approach (random effects 
versus fixed effects). However, in terms of fixed effects, parameters are consistent. In this case, 
whenever GDP grows, a firm increases its cash level, a precaution against eventual future 
shortfalls. Banking development and capital market development, for their part, have a positive 
impact on cash holdings and seem to strength the precautionary hypothesis: firms raise and hold 
more cash when they have the possibility to do so. This result was not expected but is somewhat 
in line with Dittmar et al (2003), Kalcheva and Lins (2007) and Lins et al (2010). The impact 
of shareholder rights on cash holdings is positive (except when we regress with random effects 
and when country dummy is not considered). This result was not expected, as the more rights 
shareholders have, the lower the cash holdings a firm should have. In fact, in countries with 
poor shareholder protection, capital markets are not well developed. This implies that the 
transaction costs of raising additional funds are higher, and firms may respond to this by holding 
higher liquidity. However, the positive impact of shareholder rights on cash holdings can be 
explained by the lower probability of the management extracting wealth from minority 
shareholders. Thus, there are many unresolved assumptions regarding cash holdings. Firms 
seem to consider the precautionary hypothesis in order to establish their cash-holding levels.  
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As for retained earnings, firms retain more earnings when GDP grows, and this is 
consistent with firms’ growth opportunities. Retained earnings increases are followed by the 
development of the banking system but not by capital market development. This means that 
investments in growth opportunities take the pecking order theory into consideration. A 
negative sign of capital market development and shareholder rights is the consequence of firms 
being placed in developed infrastructures presenting more financing alternatives to retained 
earnings. Nevertheless, the signs of capital market development are not definitive. 
Nevertheless, in relation to shareholder rights a negative impact on retained earnings is in line 
with the “outcome model” of La Porta et al (2000), where minority shareholders force corporate 
insiders to disgorge cash. Moreover, firms located within developed financial market 
infrastructures substitute retained earnings more easily by external financing. 
In terms of firm variables, we would such as to emphasize the opposite results of 
industry risk and size as explanatory variables of cash holdings and retained earnings. The 
positive impact of industry risk on cash holdings is motivated by precaution, while the negative 
influence of said variable on retained earnings is a reply to investors’ risk aversion. The negative 
impact of size on cash holdings is explained by the difficulties found by small firms in obtaining 
external financing. The positive impact of size on retaining earnings reflects the firms’ success 
and survival. Whatever the model being used, the sign of a dividend dummy is not consensual. 
As for the fixed effects approach, a negative impact on retained earnings and a positive impact 
on cash holdings are observed. We suspect that the firms paying dividends are larger and present 
less external financial constraints, and consequently require lower levels of cash holdings. On 
the other hand, firms that retain earnings present high-growth opportunities and deliver fewer 
dividends. Leverage exhibits a negative impact on cash holdings and retained earnings. In fact, 
a firm benefits from using the cheapest financing source, which will have a negative impact on 
leverage and will mean higher retained earnings and cash holdings. Mtb is positively related 
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with cash holdings and retained earnings because we are in the presence of a proxy for a firm 
with growth opportunities, with less collateral and riskier. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 In Table 4 we present abnormal retained earnings by country, considering a panel data 
with fixed effects (with year dummies). The signs of parameters are identical to those obtained 
for retained earnings. Capital market development produces a negative impact on abnormal 
retained earnings, although without statistical significance. Banking development, in turn, 
confirms its positive impact on abnormal retained earnings. Firms placed in developed banking 
systems have an infrastructure that supply capital in an efficient and cheaper way. Thus, 
whenever firms’ growth opportunities exhibit a positive trend, the relevant banking system 
retains earnings for their purposes. This result confirms the hypothesis of banking monitoring: 
in countries with developed banking systems, credit holders are more protected and have more 
information about borrowers. As for GDP growth, we found a positive impact of such a variable 
on abnormal retained earnings. This confirms the hypothesis that abnormal retained earnings 
are dependent on firm growth opportunities. In fact, one expects an increase in abnormal 
retained earnings during a period of economic growth. For their part, abnormal retained 
earnings decrease after a financial crisis, reflecting lower firm growth opportunities. GDP 
growth and financial crises reflect the effect of firm growth opportunities on abnormal retained 
earnings.  
Industry risk presents a negative impact on abnormal retained earnings, although 
without statistical significance because of the way the variable was built. Investors seem to be 
risk averse and prefer dividends instead of being exposed to a firm’s growth opportunities. 
Dividend payments negatively influence abnormal retained earnings. Shareholders prefer 
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dividends instead of growth opportunities, particularly when the latter do not exist. On the other 
hand, dividend payment is a practice of large firms, which lack the financial external constraints 
of small firms. Moreover, this signifies that management is not trying to expropriate minority 
shareholders. The results also confirm that leverage influences negatively retained earnings. 
This result confirms the reputation of the pecking order theory, and in particular retained 
earnings as the cheapest source of financing. Size positively influences retained earnings, and 
this reflects at least the larger problems of small firms to raise money. They retain fewer 
earnings but are asking credit holders and shareholders to have trust in their purposes. 
Obviously, they will have difficulty growing. MtB positively influences retained earnings, 
which confirms our previous results that firms with growth opportunities and low collateral 
assets must retain more in order fulfill their objectives. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 5 analyzes the determinants of abnormal retained earnings using the following 
subsamples: emerging markets, developed markets, civil-law-based countries, common-law-
based countries, countries with low shareholder rights, countries with high shareholder rights, 
and the USA. In terms of country variables, we would like to highlight the positive consensual 
impact of GDP growth on abnormal retained earnings. This confirms the hypothesis of growth 
opportunities, i.e., growth opportunities increase with GDP and reflect higher abnormal retained 
earnings. This happens whatever subsample is used. Banking development, except for emerging 
markets and the USA, shows a positive impact on abnormal retained earnings. Managers seem 
to use private credit to finance abnormal retained earnings, i.e., growth opportunities. In the 
case of emerging markets and the USA, capital market development has a positive effect on 
abnormal earnings. This puzzle must be analyzed in further research, because both samples 
21 
 
present different institutional settings and, according to the pecking order hypothesis, firms 
should choose debt instead of equity. Nevertheless, in relation to banking development, one 
must note the higher value of the high shareholders parameter in relation to the low shareholders 
parameter – 0.0183 vs. 0.0007 – confirming the agency hypothesis. However, the same trend is 
not confirmed when we compare common-law-based countries with civil-law-based countries. 
We expected a higher value for common-law-based parameters, but this did not occur. 
With regard to firm variables, the results are in line with previous ones. The higher 
negative value for dividend parameters in the case of the subsample low shareholders rights – 
-0.0048 vs. -0.0006 – reflects higher dividend payout ratios on undeveloped infrastructures 
where investors can be expropriated. This also occurs when we compare civil-law-based 
countries with common-law-based countries, and when we compare emerging countries with 
developed capital markets. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As for the 2008 financial crisis, except for the USA, abnormal retained earnings showed 
a negative impact on abnormal retained earnings. Possibly because of low-growth 
opportunities, investors have preferred a bird-in-hand. The positive signal obtained for the USA 
reflects a different trend in growth opportunities and probably explains, at least partially, the 










The results of our work show opposite trends for cash holdings and retained earnings. Cash 
holdings around the world have increased, motivated by precaution, contrary to retained 
earnings, which have followed a decreasing trend in firms’ growth opportunities. In fact, we 
show that cash holdings are influenced by precautionary motives and retained earnings by firm 
growth opportunities. Abnormal retained earnings have risen with GDP growth and have 
decreased following the 2008 financial crisis, confirming the hypothesis of firm growth 
opportunities. US firms present positive abnormal retained earnings after the 2008 financial 
crisis, contrary to the remaining firms around the world. This helps explain recent trends in the 
US stock market. 
We show there are some signs that the impact of banking system development on 
retained earnings is positive, contrary to capital market development. This can signify that 
growth opportunities are influenced by the pecking order theory once stock issuing is the last 
resort. On the other hand, there are some signs that shareholder rights negatively influence 
retained earnings, which is the consequence of the alternatives offered by banking and capital 
market infrastructures. Nevertheless, the signs of capital market development are not definitive. 
The negative impact of shareholder rights on retained earnings is in line with the “outcome 
model” of La Porta et al (2000), where minority shareholders force corporate insiders to 
disgorge cash. 
A positive impact of banking development on abnormal retained earnings is observed. 
Firms placed in developed banking systems have an infrastructure that supplies capital in an 
efficient and cheaper way. Thus, whenever firm growth opportunities exhibit a positive trend, 
the banking system involved retains earnings for their purposes. This result confirms the 
23 
 
hypothesis of banking monitoring: in countries with developed banking systems, credit holders 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Firm-Level and Country-Level Variables 
Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) 
minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) divided by total assets (WC 02999). CH is cash and short-term 
investments (WC 02001) divided by total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) are expected retained earnings and it is the firms´ annual average retained 
earnings by sector. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 
18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to 
book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilities (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 
03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. 
BD is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except 
for Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. SR is shareholder rights (La Porta 
et al (1999). Firms and N are the number of firms and observations, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. 






SR Firms N 
Developed 
              
AUSTRIA 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.24 12.48 1.32 0.69 1.26 0.26 0.02 2 124 1 010 
BELGIUM 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.24 12.52 1.51 0.63 1.12 0.65 0.02 0 154 1 310 
CANADA 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.21 10.87 1.66 0.31 1.84 1.09 0.02 5 2 287 13 766 
DENMARK 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.25 11.81 1.57 0.59 1.85 0.53 0.01 2 217 2 061 
FINLAND 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.24 12.51 1.60 0.80 1.00 1.13 0.02 3 159 1 734 
FRANCE 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.22 12.29 1.48 0.61 1.21 0.76 0.02 3 1 087 8 631 
GERMANY 0.06 0.06 0.22 0.16 0.20 12.17 1.56 0.50 1.37 0.46 0.01 1 1 018 8 460 
GREECE 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.33 11.35 1.15 0.58 1.21 0.43 -0.01 2 323 2 297 
HONG KONG 0.03 0.05 0.30 0.15 0.19 11.37 1.34 0.53 1.63 7.57 0.04 5 970 11 216 
IRELAND 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.23 12.41 1.70 0.61 1.49 0.57 0.05 4 90 777 
ISRAEL 0.04 0.05 0.29 0.17 0.28 11.18 1.37 0.35 0.86 0.78 0.04 3 421 3 048 
ITALY 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.27 12.66 1.31 0.59 1.24 0.40 0.00 1 311 2 784 
JAPAN 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.15 0.23 12.77 1.16 0.85 3.21 0.75 0.01 4 4 401 46 453 
KOREA (SOUTH) 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.25 11.81 1.13 0.59 1.46 1.42 0.04 2 1 820 17 875 
NETHERLANDS 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.23 13.14 1.69 0.65 1.65 0.99 0.02 2 249 2 377 
NEW ZEALAND 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.22 11.06 1.66 0.70 1.31 0.35 0.03 4 144 1 240 
NORWAY 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.15 0.29 11.79 1.61 0.44 0.78 0.50 0.02 4 309 2 187 
PORTUGAL 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.34 12.04 1.12 0.58 1.44 0.39 0.02 3 100 834 
SINGAPORE 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.15 0.20 11.27 1.23 0.64 0.82 2.08 0.06 4 708 7 307 
SPAIN 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.29 12.97 1.53 0.65 1.91 0.90 0.01 4 176 1 092 
SWEDEN 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.17 11.29 1.92 0.52 1.29 0.90 0.02 3 566 4 357 
SWITZERLAND 0.08 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.21 12.86 1.67 0.70 1.66 2.11 0.02 2 258 2 896 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.16 0.17 11.41 1.76 0.63 1.54 1.25 0.02 5 2 812 20 414 
UNITED STATES 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.17 0.23 12.17 1.97 0.30 2.07 1.26 0.03 5 9 399 69 420 
Mean 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.24 12.01 1.50 0.58 1.47 1.15 0.02 3.04     
Emerging 
              
ARGENTINA 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.18 11.61 1.26 0.45 0.29 0.15 0.06 4 68 548 
BRAZIL 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.29 12.43 1.40 0.63 0.87 0.51 0.03 3 390 2 472 
CHILE 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.21 11.71 1.21 0.84 0.90 1.02 0.04 5 158 1 739 
EGYPT 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.16 10.87 1.54 0.74 0.82 0.49 0.04 2 138 911 
INDIA 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.31 10.88 1.39 0.64 0.67 0.77 0.07 5 2 235 18 996 
INDONESIA 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.31 11.15 1.39 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.05 2 362 4 241 
JORDAN 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.17 9.12 1.35 0.35 1.08 1.06 0.05 1 151 926 
MALAYSIA 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.22 10.77 1.13 0.60 1.30 1.41 0.05 4 1 086 12 087 
MEXICO 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.24 13.10 1.28 0.46 0.36 0.29 0.03 1 146 1 572 
PAKISTAN 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.33 10.82 1.28 0.69 0.44 0.22 0.04 5 189 2 197 
PERU 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.21 11.25 1.23 0.54 0.20 0.41 0.05 3 108 910 
PHILIPPINES 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.20 10.41 1.37 0.43 0.52 0.55 0.05 3 182 1 983 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.17 11.75 1.48 0.63 1.74 1.96 0.03 5 554 4 152 
SRI LANKA 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.22 9.44 1.39 0.65 0.45 0.25 0.06 3 142 1 183 
TAIWAN 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.16 0.22 11.50 1.38 0.56 1.45 1.41 0.00 3 1 693 17 493 
THAILAND 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.28 11.09 1.27 0.67 1.30 0.65 0.04 2 511 5 899 
TURKEY 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.22 11.83 1.43 0.38 0.64 0.32 0.05 2 243 2 035 
Mean 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.23 11.16 1.34 0.57 0.79 0.70 0.04 3.12     
Developed - Emerging 0.00 0.00 0.05            
p-value 0.35 0.01 0.00            
Common - Civil 0.00 0.00 0.03            
p-value 0.55 0.82 0.20            
Before Crisis - After 
Crisis 
0.02 0.01 -0.01 
           







Table 2 – Correlation Coefficients 
Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) 
minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) divided by total assets (WC 02999). CH is cash and short-term 
investments (WC 02001) divided by total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) are expected retained earnings and it is the firms´ annual average retained 
earnings by sector. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 
18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to 
book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilities (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 
03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. 
BD is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except 
for Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. SR is shareholder rights (La Porta 
et al (1999). Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. 








1.00           
CH 
0.00 1.00          
IndRisk 
-0.02 0.20 1.00         
D/A 
-0.12 -0.35 -0.12 1.00        
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0.24 -0.17 -0.17 0.09 1.00       
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0.12 0.29 0.21 -0.08 -0.07 1.00      
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GROWTH 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.05 -0.02 
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0.42 0.12 1.00  
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Table 3 – Cash Holdings and Retained Earnings around the World 
Dependent variable is cash holdings and retained earnings. Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends 
(Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 
04751) divided by total assets (WC 02999). CH is cash and short-term investments (WC 02001) divided by total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) 
are expected retained earnings and it is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by 
sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total 
assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilities 
(WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) 
divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. BD is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by 
banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total 
value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from 
World Bank, except for Taiwan. SR is shareholder rights (La Porta et al (1999). Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based 
on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-values are in parentheses. 
VARIABLES 





CMD t   0.0022   0.0117   0.0022   0.0028   -0.0005   -0.0026   -0.0005   -0.0004 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.31) 
BD t  0.0286  0.0492  0.0246  0.0020   0.0090  -0.0106  0.0086  0.0158 
p-value  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.59)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH t  -0.0177  -0.0790 - 0.0127  0.0947  0.1555  0.2009  0.1558  0.1304 
p-value  (0.45)  (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SR 0.0753 -0.0108 0.0567 (omitted) -0.0320 0.0028 -0.0324 (omitted) 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
IndRisk t  0.6081  0.0882  0.0852  0.0233  -0.0328  -0.1510  -0.1385  -0.0528 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.51)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Dividend Dt  -0.0047  -0.0033  0.0009  0.0138  0.0228  0.0191  0.0226   -0.0023 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
D/At  -0.3377  -0.3202  -0.3213  -0.1828  -0.0661  -0.0659  -0.0679  -0.1110 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE t  -0.0193  -0.0174  -0.0190  -0.0287  0.0128  0.0131  0.0129  0.0233 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MtB t  0.0547  0.0515  0.0522  0.0229  0.0105  0.0112  0.0108  0.0126 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CrisisD t    0.0342    0.0189    0.0428    0.0342 -0,0242 -0,0111 -0,0230 -0,0297 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant -0.0849 0.3016 0.0383 0.5240  0.0556  -0.0801  0.0667  -0.2080 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Sector dummy No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 312.890 312.890 312.890 312.890 312.890 312.890 312.890 312.890 
Firms 36.459 36.459 36.459 36.459 36.459 36.459 36.459 36.459 







Table 4 – Abnormal Retained Earnings around the World 
Dependent variable is abnormal retained earnings. Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope 
data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) divided 
by total assets (WC 02999). CH is cash and short-term investments (WC 02001) divided by total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) are expected 
retained earnings and it is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of 
earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets 
(wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilities (WC 
03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided 
by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. BD is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by banking 
sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total value 
of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World 
Bank, except for Taiwan. SR is shareholder rights (La Porta et al (1999). Sample period is from 1995 to 2014.Statistical inference based on 
cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-values are in parentheses. 
ARIABLES ABNORMAL RETAINED EARNINGS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CMD t -0.0005 -0.0003 (omitted) (omitted) 
p-value (0.24) (0.58)   
BD t 0.0145 (omitted) 0.0143 0.0142 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH t 0.1279 0.1060 0.1514 0.1253 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SR (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
p-value     
IndRisk t -0.0024 -0.0065 -0.0022 (omitted) 
p-value (0.89) (0.70) (0.90)  
Dividend Dt -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0025 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D/At -0.1102 -0.1098 -0.1101 -0.1102 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE t 0.0233 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MtB t 0.0123 0.0123 0.0123 0.0123 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CrisisD t -0.0060 -0.0016 -0.0202 -0.0203 
p-value (0.00) (0.33) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -0.2892 -0.2671 -0.2892 -0.2895 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
6 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
312.890 312.890 312.890 312.890 
Firms 
36.459 36.459 36.459 36.459 
Adj. R2 







Table 5 – Abnormal Retained Earnings around the World by Class of Countries 
Panel regressions report fixed-effects. Dependent variable is abnormal retained earnings (ARE). Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net 
income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, 
retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) divided by total assets (WC 02999). CH is cash and short-term investments (WC 02001) divided by 
total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) are expected retained earnings and it is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector . Industry risk is 
the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). 
DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-
to-book is defined as total liabilities (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and 
market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. BD is banking development and is defined 
as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). CMD is capital market 
development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World Ba nk, except for 
Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. SR is shareholder rights (La Porta et al (1999). Sample period is 
from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-












USA High SR 
CMD t 0.0049 -0.0007 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0076 -0.0008 0.0110 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
BD t -0.0179 0.01083 0.0202 0.0106 0.0007 0.0183 -0.0436 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH t 0.0576 0.1689 0.1348 0.1295 0.1059 0.1607 0.0957 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
IndRisk t 0.1637 -0.0569 0.0726 -0.0556 0.0270 -0.0251 0.0237 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.24) (0.37) 
Dividend Dt -0.0054 -0.0010 -0.0043 -0.0006 -0.0048 -0.0006 -0.0059 
p-value (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.56) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) 
D/At -0.1316 -0.1031 -0.1307 -0.1000 -0.1247 -0.1035 -0.0916 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE t 0.0171 0.0260 0.0205 0.0247 0.0211 0.0242 0.0377 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MtB t 0.0148 0.0123 0.0145 0.0115 0.0151 0.0118 0.0144 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CrisisD t -0.0033 -0.0173 -0.0122 -0.0210 -0.0140 -0.0204 0.0012 
p-value (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) 
Constant -0.1798 -0.3230 -0.2820 -0.2855 -0.2364 -0.3104 -0.3864 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 79.344 233.546 141.188 171.702 99.299 213.591 69.420 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 
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